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In this paper, we use a panel approach to study population growth in major cities around the
world. We find that major cities grow faster in relatively backward economies and in more
volatile, faster-growing economies. We also find that the effects of trade policy on the growth of
major cities hinge heavily on geography. While population growth in major cities located at or
near ports does not change after an upsurge of trade flows, population growth in landlocked
major cities tends to slow down after the same event.  On the other hand, we do not find any
effect of political regime on the population growth of major cities. Finally, we find some
evidence that, other things being equal, larger cities tend to grow at smaller rates.
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1. Introduction
Urbanization has been steadily increasing around the world since the dawn of the industrial
revolution 200-odd years ago. The rate of urbanization has not only proceeded at different
speeds from one country to another, but has also taken different forms, from a few huge central
agglomerations in some countries to many scattered towns in others.  The causes of these
differences are many, and likely include geographical and historical factors as well as economic
and political ones.
In this paper, we focus our attention on the different economic and political factors that
determine the patterns of urban concentration. We focus, in particular, on the determinants of
population growth in main cities.  The issue is an important one. Main cities have grown so fast
(and so large) in many developing countries that they have often overwhelmed the ability of local
authorities to guarantee public safety and provide adequate public services--not to mention that
overly dominant major cities often create resentment and exacerbate ethnic and racial conflicts.
  But size is not necessarily bad when it comes to cities. Large cities often enjoy
significant agglomeration economies, stemming from both knowledge spillovers among firms
within the same industry and cross-fertilization among industries. Large cities also facilitate the
division of labor and the provision of public services, and reduce transport costs. All these
forces should make major cities more productive and, therefore, the focal points of any strategy
looking to spur economic growth.
1
Regardless, we believe that an understanding of the causes underlying the growth of
major cities is paramount. This paper is not the first one to explore this line of inquiry. Wheaton
and  Shishido (1981) studied the connection between economic development and urban
concentration (defined as the share of the total population of a country living in the country’s one
or two main cities). They found that urban concentration first increases and then decreases with
per capita GDP and that urban concentration decreases with the size of the country. Ades and
Glaeser (1995) carried out the most comprehensive study to date of the determinants of urban
                                                                
1 See Glaeser (1998) for a complete analysis of the agglomeration and congestion forces that affect the
productivity in cities.6
concentration. They used both cross-country regressions and case studies. They found that
despotic and unstable regimes tend to increase urban concentration. They also found, although
the evidence is here less definitive, that trade openness tends to reduce urban concentration.
In this paper, we reexamine the evidence presented by Ades and Glaeser, using a panel
of countries. Our paper differs from Ades and Glaeser’s on two counts. First, we consider a
larger set of explanatory factors, and, second, we focus on the population growth of major cities
rather than their absolute population levels. Our methodological choices allow us not only to
study the dynamics of urban concentration (e.g., do main cities grow slowly as they become
larger?), but also to examine more accurately the effects of political and economic factors on the
rise and fall of main cities.
We find that, other things equal, main cities grow faster in relatively underdeveloped
economies and in more volatile, faster growing economies. We do not find that the type of
political regime has any effect on the growth of main cities. In our sample, major cities grow at
the same rate in democracies and dictatorships, which casts some doubts on  Ades and
Glaeser’s contention to the effect that dictatorships bring about concentration in a single
metropolis. However, we find, as in Ades and Glaeser, that political instability does tend to
speed up the growth of main cities.
We also find that population growth in major cities slows down as they become larger,
which suggests the presence of natural limits to the size of cities (i.e., a threshold above which
congestion forces completely overwhelm any benefit that may stem from agglomeration).
Finally, we find that the effects of trade policy on the growth of major cities hinge heavily on
geography. While population growth in major cities located at or near ports does not change
after an upsurge of trade flows, population growth in landlocked major cities tends to slow
down after the same event.
Most of our results are robust not only to changes in specification, but also to changes in
the length of the average periods used in the panels and changes in the estimation technique. The
structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual discussion of the different
factors that may affect urban concentration.  Section 3 describes our empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the main empirical results of the paper. Section 5 presents some robustness7
checks. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2. Explaining Changes in Urban Concentration
In this section, we discuss political and economic factors that can in principle account for the
observed changes in urban concentration. The discussion below emphasizes the intuitive rather
than the technical aspects of the theories. Readers interested in more formal treatments are
referred to original presentations (notably Ades and Glaeser, 1995 and Krugman and Livas,
1996).
Trade Policy and Urban Concentration
The connection between trade policy and urban concentration was first formalized by Krugman
and Livas (1996). According to these authors, in a world of scale economies and transportation
costs, a rise in trade barriers will increase urban concentration. If barriers to trade are raised,
internal markets will become more important and more firms will tend to locate in the main city
in order to take advantage of cheaper inputs (forward linkages) and easier access to consumers
(backward linkages). Conversely, if barriers to trade are reduced, foreign markets will gain
preeminence and the main city will no longer be the place to be for firms and workers looking
for customers and bargains.
According to the previous argument, greater openness will reduce urban concentration
by reducing the incentives faced by firms to locate in the main city. While this is certainly the
case for landlocked main cities, it is not necessarily the case for main cities located near ports
(or other transport nodes, for that matter).  Indeed, greater openness can prompt firms to move
to main cities that are located near ports. If barriers to trade are curtailed, some firms will put a
greater emphasis on foreign markets and others will rely increasingly on foreign suppliers. Both
will find it profitable to locate near ports in order to economize on transport costs, and, as a
result, port cities could experience an outburst of growth.
To sum up, the effect of a change in openness on urban concentration is ambiguous and
will depend heavily on whether the central location is an important node in the trade flows of the
country in question. If so, greater openness may increase concentration. Otherwise, the8
Krugman-Livas argument applies more directly, and we should expect a fall in urban
concentration following a reduction in the barriers to trade.
Political Rights, Political Instability and Urban Concentration
The question here is: do authoritarian governments tend to be more biased in favor of central
city dwellers than democratic ones? Ades and Glaeser (1995) argue in the affirmative. Their
argument has two parts. First, they argue that political participation in democratic regimes is
very different from political participation in authoritarian regimes. While in democratic regimes
people participate in politics through voting and the formation of interest groups, in authoritarian
regimes people participate in politics through revolts and ultimately through organized attempts
to topple the extant ruler.  They argue next, and this is the crux of their argument, that while
central city dwellers have the edge over hinterland residents in the latter form of participation,
they may not necessarily have it in the former. According to Ades and Glaeser, in authoritarian
regimes, only central city dwellers have the ability to overthrow the extant government and so
rulers will tend to cater mostly to them. By contrast, in democratic regimes, all citizens–no
matter where they live–have the right to vote and organize into interest groups and so rulers will
be more neutral when it comes to allocating resources between the central location and the
hinterland.
If taken at face value, Ades and Glaeser’s argument implies that urban concentration
increases with both a reduction in political rights and an increase in political instability. But this
argument (and hence its implications) can be objected to on several grounds. For one thing,
hinterland residents may have the same ability to revolt against despotic governments. For
example, the only three successful popular revolts against dictators in recent Latin America
history  (the first one in Mexico, the second in Cuba, and the third one in Nicaragua) were all
waged by peasant movements with few connections with central-city interests.  For another,
central city dwellers can also sway political outcomes in their favor in democratic regimes, if
only because the higher population densities of central locations help ameliorate the well-known9
collective action problems of political participation (a point forcefully made by Bates, 1981 for
the case of Africa).
On the whole, the effect of democracy on urban concentration depends on the relative
political power of two different groups of citizens in two different types of political regimes and
as such remains essentially an empirical question.
Volatility
Hinterland residents may migrate to the central location in the face of high volatility for at least
two reasons. First, central locations have more diversified economies and hence offer some
hedging opportunities not available anywhere else. And second, central locations provide more
opportunities to start anew for those hinterland residents whose livelihoods are destroyed by
bouts of volatility, especially so in developing countries where the presence of sophisticated
informal labor markets in large cities allows new migrants to start anew almost upon arrival.
2
According to the first argument above, moving to the central location is the best option
for many hinterland residents who want to minimize risk in the absence of insurance markets.
According to the second argument, moving to the central location is the only option for many
hinterland residents who cannot salvage their businesses or their jobs after an economic
downturn mainly because they don’t have access to credit markets.  So the absence of
insurance and credit markets is a key condition for the postulated relationship between urban
concentration and volatility.
 Dynamic Considerations
The main question here is: do main cities tend to grow faster as they become larger? In theory,
the answer will depend on whether the benefits of agglomeration outweigh its costs. On the one
hand, dynamic externalities stemming from knowledge spillovers across different industries and
across different firms of the same industry can increase economic growth (and ultimately
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population growth) in large cities. On the other hand, congestion effects, in their usual
manifestations of crime, pollution and traffic gridlock, can completely overwhelm the ability of
large cities to continue growing. Intuitively, one would expect that cities would eventually lose
some dynamism once they cross a certain threshold.
Apart from dynamic externalities, there are powerful coordination forces (of the kind
emphasized by Krugman, 1991) that will prevent main cities from breaking apart even in the
face of very adverse conditions. Of course, the presence of coordination effects implies that
urban dynamics will exhibit a great deal of inertia, which is to say that the fate of main cities will
be decided by long-run forces and not by the vagaries of this period or that.
Agriculture, Development and Urban Concentration
Ades and Glaeser (1995) argue that the potential for the centralization of economic activity (and
hence the potential for urban concentration) will be lower in countries where agriculture
comprises a large fraction of total output. In their view, agriculture, by tying firms to the land,
reduces spatial mobility among productive units and hence the potential for the centralization of
economic activity in a few locations. Although true for the levels of urban concentration, this
argument does not make much sense if one is considering the changes of urban concentration.
One can argue, indeed, that the potential for industrial growth and the centralization of economic
activity will be much greater in agriculture-based economies where many scale and scope
economies are still up for grabs.
3
Labor Mobility and Ethnic Fragmentation
The argument here is that the potential for urban concentration will be diminished if people, for
cultural or other reasons, are unwilling to move in order to take advantage of greater economic
opportunities. Obviously, spatial mobility will be lower in the presence of strong ethnolinguistic
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Garcia López and Spilimbergo (1995).
3 Wheaton and Shishido (1981) make a similar argument when studying the connection between urban
concentration and the level of development.11
divisions, as people are more reluctant to pursue economic opportunities if that comes at the
cost of learning a new language or adapting to a new cultural environment.
Consider, for example, the case of Bolivia as described by  Urquiola (2000). The
pattern of urbanization in Bolivia has been very different from that of its neighboring countries. In
Bolivia, urban concentration has steadily declined over the last four decades as La Paz has lost
preeminence and Cochabamba and Santa Cruz have emerged as alternate population centers.
Why? We must first note that Bolivia is a country with three very distinct geographical regions:
the Andean (or highland region), the Sub-Andean (or Valley) region and the lowlands. These
regions overlap closely with the main ethnolinguistic divisions of the country: Aymara is the most
common native language in the Andean region, Quechua, the language of the Incas, is the most
common language of the sub-Andean region, and Guarani is common in the lowland. According
to Urquiola, the overlapping of ethnic and geographic divisions has raised the cost of between-
region migration in Bolivia and has accordingly boosted within-region migration, which in turn
has given rise to three main population centers, one in each region. The end result: urban
concentration is very low in the country as a whole but very high within each region.
4
In short, ethnolinguistic divisions can reduce urban concentration by limiting people’s
propensity to migrate in search of greater economic opportunities.  Nonlinearities may be
important in this context: the role of ethnic divisions will be very high if nobody dares to move
but will dissipate almost completely once a critical mass of people have left the hinterlands and
settled in the central location.
5
3. Estimation Issues and Data
There are two alternative approaches to study the determinants of urban concentration. First,
one could use a cross section of countries. In this case, one would first compute the average of
                                                                
4 Raphael and Riker (1998) study the connection between mobility and race in the United States. They find
that the lower propensities to move among Blacks can explain a sizable fraction of the white-black wage
differential.
5 Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996) emphasize this type on nonlinearities in their study of the
so-called Great Black Migration.12
both urban concentration and the different explanatory variables over some period of time, and
then study the association between one and the others (as done by Ades and Glaeser, 1995).
The main problem with this approach is that the level of urban concentration, which tends to be
very persistent over time, can hardly be explained by the recent values of economic and political
variables. Consider, for example, a case in which we are trying to measure the effects of trade
liberalization on urban concentration. Ideally, we should use averages of urban concentration,
trade openness and the relevant controls over a long period of time (at least 50 years). In
practice, however, information is not always available for long periods of time, and so we may
be forced to use averages over much shorter periods. The problem is then that it will be very
difficult to justify any connection between the recent history of trade openness (that can differ
substantially from the past history) and the current level of urban concentration. After all, the
level of urban concentration at any point of time is the result of a long history that goes back for
decades if not centuries.
6
Alternatively, one could use a panel approach. In this case one no longer focuses on the
determinants of the levels of urban concentration, but rather on the determinants of the changes
in urban concentration. The main problem of this approach is that one would have to make
arbitrary assumptions about the length of the time horizon needed to discern the effects of time-
varying variables on urban concentration. Are ten years enough to appreciate the effects of
trade liberalization on urban concentration? What about the case of a change in political regime?
Can we use the same horizon in both cases? Obviously, all these questions have no easy answer
as they refer to empirical matters over which is difficult to make an educated guess at the outset.
The empirical literature on economic growth and development provides a useful analogy
of the choices at hand. In this literature, one could focus on either the levels of output (à la Hall
and Jones, 1999) or the rates of growth (à la Barro, 1991). Likewise, one could focus here on
either the levels or the changes of urban concentration. As a general rule, one should use levels if
one wants to emphasize the effects of time-invariant factors (e.g., geography and culture) and
one should use growth rates if one wants to emphasize the effects of policy variables that change
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frequently over time (e.g., trade openness). In this paper, we want to do both but we pay
especial attention to the latter, hence we opt for a panel approach.
  In addition, we firmly believe that in this case the benefits of using a panel approach
outweigh the costs. A cross-sectional approach can lead to serious inference problems because
in general we have information only about the recent evolution of many of the explanatory
variables. Moreover, a panel approach allows us to study dynamic effects, and also allows us to
address some of the most pressing endogeneity problems. We deal with the unknown lagged
structure in a practical fashion: we first assume that a ten-year horizon is enough to discern the
effects of political and economic variables on the changes in urban concentration and then we
experiment with other values as a robustness check.
We estimate the following model
it i it i it it it it it ? M U U M M + + ¢ + ¢ + - + - = - - - - - m g f 1 1 1 1 ) ln( ) 1 ( )} ln( ) {ln( ) ln( ) ln( x ß z ? ,   (1)
where Mit is the population of the main urban agglomeration of country i at the beginning of
decade t, Uit is the urban population of country i at the beginning of decade t,  zi is a vector of
time-invariant attributes of country  i, xit-1 is a vector of time-varying attributes of country i
averaged over the decade t-1, mi is a country-specific effect and nit is the error term. Intuitively,
equation (1) postulates that the difference between the population growth of main cities and the
population growth of urban areas depends on the population of the main city at the beginning of
the decade (in logs) and a few economic and political factors.
We can slightly rewrite equation (1) as
it i it i it it ? y y + + ¢ + ¢ + = - - m g 1 1 x ß z ?                                       (2)
where yit = ln(Mit) and the urban population growth is now part of the vector xit-1.  Equation (2)
has received a great deal of attention in the econometrics literature. Estimation of (2) must deal
with the fact that, by construction, the lagged dependent variable and  m are correlated.
Estimation by fixed-effects doesn’t solve this problem unless the time dimension of the panel
approaches infinity (which it clearly does not in this case).
7 A large menu of estimation
                                                                                                                                                                                                
history.
7 See, for example, Hsiao (1986, p.75).14
techniques has been proposed in the literature to address this problem. All techniques rely on
more or less restrictive assumptions about the endogeneity of the different  regressors.
8 As
pointed out by Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen (1999), none of the techniques seems to be
best for all circumstances
In general, the bias and efficiency of the different estimation techniques depend on the
characteristics of the data, the dimensions of the panel (T and N), and the value of g. Judson
and Owen (1999) have recently used Monte Carlo exercises to evaluate the bias and efficiency
of the most popular techniques to estimate dynamic panels. Their exercise explicitly attempts to
reproduce the characteristics of most macro data sets (small T, large N and relatively large
explanatory power of the independent variables). These authors find first that almost all
estimation techniques yield reasonable estimates of b (the biases are in most cases smaller than
3 percent). They also find that for a panel like ours (0.8<g<1, T<5, N»100), OLS provides the
most accurate estimators of g. Their results to this effect are reproduced in Table 1. As shown,
OLS estimators have a very small bias, the smallest standard deviations and by far the smallest
mean square errors.
9
Unlike both fixed-effects and the standard Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
OLS makes use of both the cross-sectional and temporal variation of the data. This not only
increases the efficiency of the b estimators, but also permits the otherwise impossible estimation
of the r estimators. However, OLS estimators will be biased if the explanatory variables are
correlated with some omitted country-effects that go into m. We deal with this problem in a
practical fashion: we estimate equation (2) before and after controlling for several observed
country effects and then we compare the estimators in the various specifications. We find that
the estimators are almost identical in all the specifications, which dispel some fears regarding the
importance of omitted country effects.
                                                                
8 See, for example, Balestra and Nerlove (1966), Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991),
Kiviet (1995), Arellano and Bovet (1995) and Judson and Owen (1999).
9 Kiviet (1995, p.70) finds a very similar result using a different Monte Carlo simulation. In his words, “we
find that OLS has impressingly small standard deviation, and therefore, when bias is moderate (which it is
for higher g values), it has an attractive mean squared error.”15
Endogeneity problems are also potentially important in this context. Dictatorships, for
example, may encourage urban concentration, but urban concentration may also facilitate coups
and hence the emergence of dictatorships. One the main advantage of the GMM techniques is
that they allow us to minimize the endogeneity assumptions we have to make. But this advantage
usually comes at the cost of diminished precision in the estimates (Kiviet, 1995 and Judson and
Owen, 1999).
10 On the other hand, in light of the instrumental variable evidence reported by
Ades and Glaeser (1995), endogeneity problems are likely to be small in this context.
Description of the Data
The data set we use in this paper comprises 105 countries and spans three decades: from 1960
to 1990. Data on urbanization and population come from the 1996 United Nations data set on
urban agglomerations.
11 Data on GDP, trade flows and agriculture come from the Penn World
Tables. Data on democracy come from the Polity III data set compiled by Jaggers and Robert
(1995). Data on political instability are from Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) and the
data on  ethnolinguistic fragmentation from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and  Vishny
(1998). Data on land area come from the World Development Indicators, and data on ports
from the Encyclopedia Britannica. Ten-year averages were used for most of the explanatory
variables.
Some of our indicators require some explanation. Our indicator of democracy measures
the presence of institutions that facilitate participation and inclusion. In particular, the ten-point
scale measures the presence of institutions that allow citizens to express their preferences,
constrain arbitrary use of power by elected leaders, and exert the right to participate in politics.
This emphasis on regime structure, however, does not allow an explicit consideration of civil
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and Loayza, 1998 for an application to cross-country differences in crime rates).
11 This data set contains information for 431 urban agglomerations in 105 countries. As of 1995, the total




We measure political instability by the average number of successful coups per year
over a decade. As mentioned earlier, this variable attempts to measure the perception of the
extant ruler regarding the probability of being ousted by a public-led revolt. Surprisingly, the
correlation between this variable and other indicators of political instability is very low (less than
0.1 for the case of riots and political assassinations, for example). We use successful coups to
ensure the comparability of our results with Ades and Glaeser’s (1995).
We measure volatility by the standard deviation of GDP growth. In principle, volatility
of growth can arise from many sources, including terms of trade shocks, financial shocks and
changes in macroeconomic policies. Here we do not make any attempt to disentangle the effects
of the different sources of GDP volatility. We measure the changes in trade policy by computing
the change in total exports and imports as a percentage in GDP from one decade to the next.
We use changes in openness rather than the corresponding levels because we believe that they
provide a more accurate indicator of trade policy—after all, the levels of openness are the result
of many geographical and historical factors that have little connection with current policy
interventions.
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables of our study. The average
ten-year population growth of the main cities in our sample is 35.9%, a rate slightly higher than
that of the total urban population. Interestingly, most variables in our sample vary much more
across countries than across decades. Thus, almost all the variation in political regimes and the
levels of trade, most of the variation in political instability and most of the variation in GDP
volatility comes from differences between countries. These results highlight the importance of
taking into account the cross-country variation when estimating the effects of these variables.
4. Results
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Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of Equation (1). The dependent variable is the population
growth in the main city from on decade to the next. The independent variables include averages
of the political and economic indicators mentioned above, the population in the main city at the
beginning of the period (in logs), and the growth of the urban population in the decade under
scrutiny. The correlations between the dependent and the explanatory variables are presented in
Appendix 1.
  The estimates of (g-1) are negative, significant and very similar across all specifications.
This result provides compelling evidence that the rate of population growth of main cities tend to
slow down as they become larger, perhaps because of their inability to cope with congestion
problems. On the other hand, the various estimates of  (1-g) also imply that the population of
main cities moves very sluggishly over time: seldom do large changes occur from one decade to
the next, indicating that population levels tend to be very persistent over time.
Regression (1) of Table 3 shows that on average trade policy appears to have little
effect on the population growth of main cities: the coefficient on the change in openness is
negative but not significant. Regressions (2)-(4) show that if we allow the effects of trade policy
to differ according to whether or not the main city is a port, a somewhat different conclusion
emerges. In the new specifications, the results show that an increase in openness will affect the
rate of population growth only in major cities that are landlocked. All else being equal, an
increase in trade flows over GDP of ten percentage points will reduce population growth by 1.5
percentage points per decade in landlocked main cities, and will have no effect in port cities. In
sum, the Krugman and Livas hypothesis appears to apply only to central locations (in the literal
sense of the word), but even there the effects are likely to be small.
We also find that main cities tend to grow faster in those countries where agriculture
comprises a higher fraction of total output. All else being equal, a difference of ten percentage
points in the relative importance of agriculture will be associated with 1.8 percentage points per
decade of faster growth in main cities. This result suggests that main cities grow very fast in the
earlier stages of development, and then slow down (but continue growing) as development
advances. Figure 1 is consistent with this view. As shown, the fraction of the total population18
living in main cities has grown steadily since 1950 in both developed and developing countries,
but has done it much faster in the latter group.
GDP volatility also appears to speed up the rate of population growth in main cities. The
effects are noticeable and significant in all cases. A difference of four percentage points in
volatility (roughly equivalent to the difference in mean volatilities of OECD and Sub-Saharan
countries) will be associated with at least three percentage points per decade of faster
population growth in main cities.  Average economic growth also appears to speed up the rate
of population growth of main cities, implying that temporary bursts of growth could trigger
massive migration toward central locations where presumably the bulk of the growth-generating
activity is taking place.
13
We don’t find any effect of the type of political regime on the rate of population growth
of main cities.  In our sample, main cities grow at similar rates in democracies and dictatorships.
This result stands in sharp contrast with the contention of Ades and Glaeser to the effect that
dictatorships cause concentration in a single metropolis.  Ades and Glaeser base their contention
on the positive correlation between average urban concentration from 1970 to 1985 and
“average” political regime in the same period.  The problem with Ades and Glaeser’s argument
is that the levels of urban concentration (which surely embodied a history of many years) are
not likely to be greatly affected by recent political developments. To put it bluntly, the high levels
of urban concentration of Argentina and Chile in the 1970s and 1980s were not caused by the
military regimes that ruled these countries during these decades. After all, Buenos Aires and
Santiago already comprised over 30 percent of their countries’ population in 1970, not to
mention that Chile was ruled by democratic regimes for most of the 20
th century.
14
As in  Ades and  Glaeser, we find that political instability is associated with higher
population growth in major cities. Because political instability is usually highly correlated with
civil strife, this result may not reflect so much the urban biases of unstable regimes suggested by
                                                                
13 We include GDP growth mainly as a control. Because we use the standard deviation of growth rates of
GDP to measure volatility, controlling for average growth is necessary to make sure that our indicator of
volatility is not just capturing growth effects.
14 Moreover, the share of the Argentina’s population living in Buenos Aires fell from 35.13 in 1970 to 34. 72
in 1985.19
Ades and Glaeser as the migration toward main cities of hinterland residents who have been
threatened or dispossessed by the parties in conflict.
15  On the other hand, we don’t find
compelling evidence of any relationship between  ethnolinguistic fragmentation and main city
growth. As predicted above, the coefficient in question is negative in all specifications, but is
also very small and non-significant throughout.
As mentioned above, OLS estimates will be biased if some of the  covariates are
correlated with omitted country-specific variables.  In a panel approach, we can obviate this
problem by either estimating the equation in first differences or in differences from the country
means. These options, however, ignore the cross-country variation altogether, greatly limiting
the information available to estimate the various effects under analysis. Here we try to assess the
importance of this problem by first estimating our basic specification with and without some
observed country specific factors and then comparing the estimates of the different time-varying
factors across the different specifications.
Thus, regression (3) includes three additional country-specific variables, the log of the
area and one dummy variable for capitals and another for ports. And regression (4) includes
three regional dummies (one for Latin America, one for OECD countries and the last one for
Sub-Saharan countries). As shown, the estimates are very similar across the different
specifications, which offers partial support to our contention that biases stemming from omitted
country factors are likely to be small. 
16
5.   Robustness Checks
In this section, we carry out two robustness checks. First, we change the lengths of the
panel periods and then we use two alternative estimation techniques.
Table 4 shows the main results of the first exercise. Two remarks are in order before
                                                                
15 The United Nations estimates that around the world at least four million people are “internally displaced”
every year as a result of civil strife. In Colombia alone, clashes between leftist and right-wing paramilitary
groups have driven as many as a million from their homes in the last thirty years. See Parfit (1998).
16 We obtain almost identical results when we try other country-specific variables, including average fertility
rates, latitude, and dummies for communist regimes and for islands.20
looking at the results. First, the number of observations changes not only because more or fewer
periods are added to the panels but also because more or fewer countries become available as
we shorten or lengthen the size of the periods. And second, because the dependent variable
refers to the change in population in the period under question (it is not the annualized rate), the
units of some of the implied slopes change from one case to another and so the coefficients are
not immediately comparable.
Several of the main results discussed above hold up regardless of the length of the
period considered. The dampening effect of population size in the subsequent changes in
population is evident in all cases considered. Similarly, the effects of agriculture are positive,
significant and--once the units are transformed--of similar magnitude in all cases. The effects of
volatility are also of similar size in all cases, but non-significant when five-year periods are used.
Finally, the type of political regime appears to have little effect on the growth of major cities
irrespective of the time period used in the estimation.
We observe the largest discrepancies for political instability and GDP growth. The
former variable becomes almost irrelevant when 15-year periods are used and loses
significance, although it is still quantitatively important, when 5-year periods are used. The latter
variable has a more erratic behavior: it is positive and significant in the 5-year case and negative
and marginal significant in the 15-year one. Interestingly, the latter result suggests that whereas
short bursts of economic growth have a positive effect on main city growth, longer and (perhaps
more permanent) accelerations of growth rates have the opposite effect.
The effects of trade policy, measured here by changes in trade flows over GDP, also
seem sensitive to the length of the period used in the analysis, especially if we focus on the
significance of the coefficients.  This result notwithstanding, the signs of the coefficients tell a
familiar story: trade liberalizations dampen growth in landlocked major cities and have little
effect on major cities located at or near ports.
In section 4, we use OLS to estimate the effects of various economic and political
variables on the population growth of major cities. We justify the use of OLS on two grounds.
First, OLS appears to yield, at least for the type of problem at hand, the most precise estimates
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of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. And second, OLS yields much more
efficient small-sample estimators than those techniques that disregard the cross-country variation
of the data. Now, these two properties (and especially the second one) are not unique to OLS.
Indeed, the use of any estimation technique based on the assumption of random country effects
could be justified on similar grounds.
As a robustness check, here we reestimate our basic specification under the assumption
of random country effects. We use two different techniques: the standard random-effect
regression estimator and a maximum likelihood estimator. The results are shown in Table 5. The
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are almost identical as before.  The effects of
political regime are, as before, irrelevant and non-significant. The effects of GDP growth,
agriculture and political instability are again noticeable and significant. On the other hand, the
effects of volatility and trade policy are smaller and non-significant under the new estimations.
6.   Concluding Remarks
Democracy and free trade have often been prescribed as the best antidotes against excessive
urban concentration in a single metropolitan area--a malady that afflicts many developing
countries.
17 These prescriptions, based mainly on the works of Krugman and Livas and Ades
and Glaeser, are partially challenged in this paper. For one thing, we find that, at least for the
post-war period, there is hardly any systematic relationship between political regime and the
rate of population growth of major cities. For another, we find that trade liberalization will not
necessarily curb population growth in main cities that are located at or near ports.
We find, on the other hand, that reducing political and economic instability may reduce
population growth in main cities. Our evidence suggests thus that main cities should be
understood not only as agglomerations of rent and bargain seekers (as suggested repeatedly in
the literature), but also as risk shelters. We also find that main cities tend to grow faster in
agricultural-based economies and in economies experiencing temporary bursts of economic
                                                                
17 Krugman (1994) has argued, for example, that the models of the so-called new economic geography
suggest “that Washington consensus policies of reduced government intervention and trade opening tend22
growth. All in all, we find that main cities grow faster in times of political and economic turmoil
than in times of stability.
Furthermore, we find that the rate of growth of main cities slows down as they become
larger. We interpret this result as evidence that congestion effects will eventually overwhelm any
dynamic externality stemming from either urban diversity or greater population density. Finally,
we find that, as predicted by most models of urban dynamics, main cities are glued together by
powerful forces that prevent them from breaking apart even in the presence of the most adverse
circumstances. That is to say that inertia provides a very powerful backdrop against which we
must be able to distinguish the workings of lesser forces. Therein lies one of the main difficulties
of this type of empirical analysis.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
to reduce the size of major cities or at least slow their relative growth.”23
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Method BIAS S.E. RMSE
OLS 0.049 0.026 0.055
Fixed Effects -0.504 0.058 0.508
Fixed Effects (Corrected)* -0.131 0.08 0.154
Anderson-Hsiao 0.007 0.202 0.202
GMM -0.116 0.15 0.19
Parameters: g=0.8, T=5 and N=100
* See Kiviet (1995) 
Table 1. Bias Estimates for g Using Various Estimators
Taken from Judson and Owen (1999)
Mean Within Between  Minimum Maximum
Population Growth Main City 35.9% 10.8% 20.8% -14.7% 115.0%
Population Growth All Urban Aereas 34.5% 6.2% 18.7% -0.3% 107.6%
Annual Growth of GDP per Capita 2.0% 2.1% 1.9% -10.4% 9.5%
Standard Deviation of Growth 4.6% 1.8% 2.8% 1.1% 18.6%
Trade as a Percentage of GDP 49.9% 8.6% 22.4% 9.3% 143.0%
Change in Trade as Percentage of GDP 4.3% 8.3% 7.2% -35.8% 34.3%
Agriculture as Percentage of GDP 44.1% 51.5% 25.8% 2.4% 93.0%
Democracy (Polity III) 0.042 0.897 3.990 0.000 10.000
Successful Coups 0.049 0.055 0.080 0.000 0.667
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation 0.334 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.890
Sources are discussed in the text.
Standard Deviation
Table 2.  Summary Statistics26
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.563 0.556 0.603 0.499
(0.139) (0.139) (0.150) (0.152)
%D(Urban Population) 0.625 0.630 0.595 0.632
(0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.081)
Ln(Population Main City) at  -0.039 -0.038 -0.047 -0.036
beginning of the decade (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
(Trade/GDP) - (Trade/GDP)-1 -0.114 -0.165 -0.137 -0.169
(0.090) (0.103) (0.106) (0.105)
{(Trade/GDP) - (Trade/GDP)-1}*Port 0.176 0.167 0.194
(0.172) (0.192) (0.176)
Agriculture/GDP 0.184 0.178 0.184 0.176
(0.0609) (0.061) (0.062) (0.067)
Standard Deviation of GDP 0.779 0.753 0.703 0.801
(0.319) (0.320) (0.321) (0.337)
Growth of GDP 0.851 0.900 0.860 1.009
(0.359) (0.361) (0.366) (0.391)
Democracy -0.093 -0.112 -0.202 -0.123
(0.305) (0.306) (0.320) (0.328)
Coups 0.134 0.132 0.132 0.119
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.083)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.012 -0.010 -0.033 -0.003







R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
N 206 206 206 206
Most variables refer to ten-year averages. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Democracy and riots variables were divided by 100 to facilitate the presentation of the results
Regression (4) includes dummies for Latin Amerira, Sub-Sahara Africa and OECD.
Table 3. OLS Estimates of Urban Concentration
Dependent Variable: Percent Change of Population in Main City 27
15-year period 5-year period
Intercept 0.603 0.208
(0.237) (0.056)
%D(Urban Population) 0.652 0.683
(0.105) (0.056)
Ln(Population Main City) at  -0.035 -0.015
beginning of the decade (0.015) (0.004)
(Trade/GDP) - (Trade/GDP)-1 -0.103 -0.010
(0.137) (0.053)




Standard Deviation of GDP 1.201 0.156
(0.592) (0.109)










Standard errors are in parenthesis.




%D(Urban Population) 0.600 0.603
(0.086) (0.083)
Ln(Population Main City) at  -0.048 -0.047
beginning of the decade (0.011) (0.011)
(Trade/GDP) - (Trade/GDP)-1 -0.164 -0.165
(0.102) (0.0992)




Standard Deviation of GDP 0.436 0.477
(0.320) (0.324)










Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 5. Random Effects Estimates29
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Appendix 1. Scatter Plots
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